Hanoi defense documents revealed in 2026 show Vietnam’s military preparing for a possible U.S. “war of aggression,” even after 2023 partnership upgrades and 2025 Trump trade deals, highlighting Vietnam’s balancing act between security fears and economic ties.
An internal Vietnamese Ministry of Defense document completed in August 2024 shows Hanoi preparing contingencies for a potential U.S. “war of aggression,” underscoring a widening gap between Vietnam’s expanding economic engagement with Washington and its security establishment’s threat perceptions.
The paper, titled “The 2nd U.S. Invasion Plan,” was cited in a Tuesday analysis by The 88 Project, a human rights organization, and frames the United States as a “belligerent” power even as bilateral ties were elevated in 2023 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
Security Doctrine vs Partnership
The document argues that Washington and its allies, seeking to strengthen deterrence against China, are prepared to apply “unconventional forms of warfare” and even conduct large-scale invasions against states that “deviate from its orbit.”
While Vietnamese planners acknowledge that currently there is little risk of a war against Vietnam, they add that due to the U.S.’s “belligerent nature” they need to be vigilant to prevent “the U.S. and its allies from ‘creating a pretext’ to launch an invasion” of the country.
Ben Swanton, co-director of The 88 Project, said the assessment reflects a broad institutional consensus.
This isn’t just some kind of a fringe element or paranoid element within the party or within the government.
Ben Swanton – The 88 Project
“The 2nd U.S. Invasion Plan”
Vietnamese analysts trace what they see as a steady U.S. military buildup in Asia across three administrations – Barack Obama, Donald Trump’s first term, and Joe Biden – aimed at forming a regional front against China. Yet the documents depict Beijing as a rival rather than an existential threat, reserving that category for Washington.
Dr. Zachary Abuza of the National War College in the U.S. said the military retains “a very long memory” of the war that ended in 1975 and remains primarily preoccupied with the risk of a Western-backed “color revolution,” modeled on Ukraine in 2004 or the Philippines in 1986.
Those fears surfaced publicly in June 2024, when an army television broadcast accused U.S.-linked Fulbright University of fomenting unrest, prompting a rare Foreign Ministry defense of the institution.
Nguyen Khac Giang of Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute said the military has “never been too comfortable” with the U.S. partnership, reflecting tensions between conservative security factions and more outward-facing economic technocrats.
Trade Leverage Meets Regime Anxiety
The disclosures arrive amid intensifying economic interdependence. On July 2, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a trade agreement imposing a 20% tariff on Vietnamese goods and 40% on transshipping, while granting the United States “total access” to Vietnam’s markets.
However, Chinese firms have since increasingly routed exports through Vietnam and Malaysia to evade U.S. tariffs that can reach 145%, prompting crackdowns by Vietnam and Thailand, according to the Financial Times.
Senior Counselor to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Peter Navarro amplified the pressure on April 7, 2025, calling Vietnam as “a colony of Communist China” used to evade American Tariff and warning against shrimp imports that could hurt Louisiana producers.
Trump’s rhetoric has also sharpened Hanoi’s unease. On October 5, 2025, Trump declared, “We would have won in Vietnam and Afghanistan easily if we fought to win… We are not politically correct anymore, we win now.”
Trump’s language reinforces long-standing fears inside Vietnam’s security establishment that Washington retains a coercive mindset toward weaker states, lending credibility to military planners who argue the U.S. could still resort to force or regime pressure. In Hanoi, such remarks are read less as domestic bravado than as strategic signaling, hardening skepticism about U.S. intentions even as economic ties deepen.
At the same time, Trump’s family business broke ground on a $1.5 billion golf and luxury real estate project in Hung Yen province after To Lam became Communist Party general secretary, signaling parallel tracks of political suspicion and commercial engagement.
Maduro’s Capture Spurs Regional Anxiety
China remains Vietnam’s largest two-way trade partner, while the United States is its biggest export market, forcing Hanoi into a constant balancing act. Giang noted that Trump’s military operation to capture Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro revived conservative fears, particularly because Cuba remains a sensitive ally for Vietnam’s political elite.
Abuza said the contradiction is structural. Even reform-minded leaders assume Washington would support regime change if given the opportunity. “Yes, they like us, they’re working with us, they are good partners for now,” he said, “but given the opportunity if there were a color revolution, the Americans would support it.”
