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Why Saudi Jets Bombed UAE-Backed Forces in Yemen

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Saudi Arabia carried out airstrikes on STC-linked forces in Hadramout on December 26, 2025, according to local accounts. The strikes highlight rising Saudi-UAE rivalry in southern Yemen after STC territorial gains near the Saudi border.

Saudi airstrikes in eastern Yemen this week underscore a deepening fracture within the anti-Houthi camp, exposing how competing objectives among nominal allies are reshaping the conflict.

On December 26, 2025, forces aligned with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) accused Saudi Arabia of launching two airstrikes against their positions in Hadramout governorate, an area bordering Saudi Arabia and central to Yemen’s energy geography.

The strikes, reported at approximately 8:00 a.m. and 9:15 a.m., targeted units identified as the Hadhrami Elite Forces in the Wadi Nahb area.

Saudi Arabia has neither confirmed nor denied responsibility.

However, a Saudi-owned newspaper, Asharq Al-Awsat, cited sources describing the strikes as intended to “send a message” to the STC.

While casualty figures from the airstrikes remain unconfirmed, earlier clashes in the same area earlier in December left 2 fighters dead and 12 wounded, according to STC-linked statements.

The strikes followed rapid STC territorial advances earlier in December 2025.

UAE-backed southern forces moved into oil-rich Hadramout and neighboring al-Mahrah with minimal resistance, after Saudi-backed units withdrew.

As a result, the STC now controls nearly half of Yemen’s territory and roughly 80% of its oil reserves, while also having pushed the internationally recognized government out of Aden.

Saudi Arabia publicly objected to these moves.

On December 25, Riyadh demanded that STC forces withdraw from Hadramout and al-Mahrah, framing the takeover as an “unjustified escalation” that threatens Yemen’s unity and border security.

Hadramout’s proximity to Saudi Arabia, combined with its oil infrastructure, makes it strategically sensitive for Riyadh.

The STC rejected the demand, arguing that its operations are necessary to combat terrorism, secure supply routes, and respond to long-standing southern demands for autonomy or independence. It has vowed to maintain its positions.

The episode highlights the unresolved divergence between Saudi and Emirati objectives in Yemen.

Since leading the intervention in 2015, Saudi Arabia has prioritized restoring a unified Yemeni state under the recognized government.

The UAE, while formally part of the coalition, has focused on countering Islamist groups and backing southern separatists, including the STC formed in 2017.

Such tensions are not new.

Saudi- and UAE-backed forces clashed openly in Aden in 2019. A truce with the Houthis in 2022 reduced overall violence, but it did not resolve southern power struggles.

The December 2025 airstrikes mark the first direct Saudi military action against UAE-backed forces in several years, signaling a willingness to apply pressure directly rather than through proxies alone.

For now, there is no confirmed large-scale ground escalation.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly massed troops near the border but has not advanced. The STC’s refusal to withdraw raises the risk of renewed south-on-south fighting, which could weaken the broader front against the Houthis in northern Yemen.

The implications extend beyond Yemen’s internal balance.

Further fragmentation could complicate Red Sea security at a time when maritime risks linked to the Houthis remain elevated. International actors, including the United States, have urged restraint, but the episode underscores how fragile the current calm remains nearly 11 years after the war began in 2014 and after more than 150,000 deaths.

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Middle East

Bennett Turns Up The Heat On Netanyahu As Elections Loom

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Former Israeli PM Naftali Bennett criticized Netanyahu’s war strategy, outlining faster high-intensity alternatives for Gaza and Iran. His criticizm of Netenyahu intensifies as elections are due by October 2026.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett criticized Netanyahu’s handling of Israel’s wars and his incapability to rein in far-right minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

He positioned himself as a sharper, faster alternative ahead of elections due by October 27, 2026.

Ben-Gvir Is Hurting Israel

Bennett said it is costly for Netanyahu’s coalition to depend on National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

“Israel’s international standing is so bad. It’s shocking, largely because of failures and statements made by government ministers,” he said.

“Netanyahu knows that Ben-Gvir’s repeated stunts are enormously harmful to Israel. They damage our standing in the United States and undermine Trump’s ability to help us. But Netanyahu is incapable of putting Ben-Gvir in his place because he depends on him.”

He reminded an earlier remark regarding nuking Gaza: “When you have a minister who stupidly says, ‘We’re going to nuke Gaza,’ you pay a huge, huge international price with zero benefit,”

“And your credit pool empties, and then by the time you actually need it for material, for serious stuff, you’ve run out of credit.”

Bennett Rejected a Palestinian Consulate In East Jarusalem

Bennett examplifying his stance on the face of ally pressure, said “Biden pressured Netanyahu to agree to the establishment of an American consulate for Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Netanyahu had agreed in principle to establish it.”

“Then I entered office, and Biden told me: ‘I demand that you establish the consulate.’”

“And I told him: ‘Mr. President, Jerusalem is the capital of only one state – the State of Israel. I must refuse.'”

A Strategy of “Siege” Is More Effective For Gaza

Bennett outlined an alternative tactical framework for Gaza based on isolation and siege rather than sustained urban warfare.

“We would isolate areas, apply a full siege on those areas and let the citizens out and trap the terrorists,” Bennett said.

Bennett also offered a striking observation on Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s decision to launch the October 7 attacks.

“Do you know what Sinwar’s greatest strategic mistake was? That he attacked. Because we were on the path to self-destruction.”

A Game on Iran Already Started With Mossad

On Iran, Bennett described a multi-layered strategy he said he had already begun putting in motion during his time in office:

“We need to embark on a multi-year, long-term strategy of accelerating the collapse of the regime – not only through kinetic action while ensuring they don’t achieve a nuclear weapon before,” he said.

“The actions that I had begun with the Mossad and other groups are about 30 different actions. Not only bombing. I’m talking about economic actions. I’m talking about cyber, overt, covert.”

Bennett has previously described himself as Iran’s “worst nightmare” if returned to power.

His Together alliance, nationalist in orientation but secular and more moderate in style than Netanyahu’s current far-right coalition partners, aims to peel away right-leaning voters frustrated with Netanyahu’s legal troubles, the judicial reform crisis, and what Bennett calls governance failures since October 7.

Bennett founded a new party in 2025 called Bennett 2026, and allied with centrist Yair Lapid of Yesh Atid to form a joint list called Together (Beyachad), which Bennett leads.

The alliance has polled in double digits for Knesset seats and is considered one of the most significant electoral threats to Netanyahu’s Likud-led coalition.

Bennett previously ousted Netanyahu once, in 2021.

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Middle East

Iran Formed Secret Iraqi Cells to Strike Gulf Nations: Report

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Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have established secretive new cells in Iraq to conduct drone attacks against Gulf countries hosting American forces, bypassing established proxy networks to maintain operational secrecy and avoid detection.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has established secretive new cells in Iraq to execute attacks against Gulf countries hosting American forces.

The strategy intentionally bypasses established militia networks to avoid detection, according to eight Iraqi sources who told Reuters.

The covert network comprises three or four elite cells, each containing approximately 10 Iraqi Shi’ite fighters.

These units launched at least seven drone attacks from desert locations near Basra and Samawa against targets in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates between April 20 and May 17.

Tactical Shift Under Economic Strain

The formation of these directly controlled units represents a significant shift in Iranian tactical operations.

The strategy aims to preserve Tehran’s regional force projection at a time when its traditional proxy network is diminished and its economic resources are depleted.

While some members were selected from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq umbrella group, these new cells operate entirely outside its command structure.

The units report directly to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The development follows signals from established Iraqi Shi’ite factions that they intend to disarm and transition into domestic politics.

This shift is intended to prevent direct conflict with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.

Regional Deniability and Plausible Cover

Operating smaller, highly radicalized cadres allows Tehran to maintain plausible deniability.

The arrangement insulates major Iran-backed political groups in Baghdad from Western retaliation and reduces U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government to disband them.

The newer groups operate under unfamiliar names with minimal public profiles.

They prioritize strict ideological loyalty and low operational footprints over mass recruitment.

The U.S. State Department has reiterated expectations that the Iraqi government dismantle all instruments of Iranian activity on its soil.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and U.S. Envoy Tom Barrack recently discussed comprehensive disarmament plans for groups operating outside state control.

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Strait of Hormuz Transit Fees Waived for 60-Day Period, PGSA Confirms

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The Persian Gulf Strait Authority has confirmed that all security, safety, and environmental service fees for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz will be waived, but strictly within a specified 60-day period following the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

The Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) confirmed Friday that vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz will not be charged fees, though the waiver is strictly limited to an announced 60-day period.

The temporary financial relief follows the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and subsequent instructions from relevant authorities.

Fees After 60 Days?

During this designated 60-day window, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will also provide related insurance coverage for transiting vessels.

The suspension of service fees applies strictly to the specified timeframe, after which standard regulations are expected to resume.

Pre-Transit Mandates

To avoid operational delays at the strategic waterway’s entrance or exit, the authority has instituted mandatory pre-transit requirements.

Vessels must submit a formal transit request through official channels at least 48 hours prior to arriving in the strait area.

The application must include all required information, specifically vessel contact details and the exact route.

Safety Coordination Protocols

The PGSA cited special conditions and certain safety risks along the transit route as the basis for tightened oversight.

To ensure safe navigation and prevent maritime incidents, every vessel is required to coordinate its route and transit timing before entering the area.

The authority noted that failure to comply with these coordination and filing protocols remains the vessel owner’s sole responsibility.

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