Rwanda’s decision to pursue legal action against the United Kingdom crystallizes the collapse of one of Europe’s most controversial migration experiments. Kigali has launched arbitral proceedings at the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration, seeking £50 million ($68.8 million) after London refused to disburse final payments under a 2022 asylum partnership designed to relocate migrants arriving in Britain by small boats. Rwanda began the inter-state case in November, according to the court’s website, which lists the proceedings as pending.

Michael Butera, chief technical adviser to Rwanda’s justice minister, said Kigali had tried diplomacy before turning to arbitration, adding: “Rwanda regrets that it has been necessary to pursue these claims in arbitration, but faced with the United Kingdom’s intransigence on these issues, it has been left with no other choice.”

Under the deal, only four volunteers ultimately traveled to Rwanda, despite the program’s central role in Britain’s post-Brexit border strategy.

“A Waste of Money”

Prime Minister Keir Starmer scrapped the agreement in July 2024, shortly after taking office, declaring it “dead and buried.” By then, London had already transferred £240 million ($330.9 million) to Kigali, with a further £50 million due in April. Starmer’s spokesman said this week the government would “robustly defend our position to protect British taxpayers.”

The UK Supreme Court had ruled in November 2023 that the scheme was unlawful under international law, a judgment that capped years of legal challenges.

Money Paid, Policy Reversed

The financial dispute now sits alongside widening geopolitical strains. Last year, Britain suspended most aid to Rwanda over Kigali’s backing of the M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a move Rwanda labeled “punitive.”

Despite a U.S.-brokered April 27, 2025 agreement in which Rwanda and the DRC pledged a path to peace, violence surged again. By Dec. 10, 2025, some 200,000 people had fled a renewed M23 offensive, with 74 killed and 83 wounded as rebels advanced toward Uvira. The DRC government has repeatedly accused the Rwandan government for allegedly supporting M23 rebels.

“Send Them to Us”

The asylum pact was originally framed by Kigali as a humanitarian alternative. In July 2022, President Paul Kagame said Rwanda had offered the international community a way to spare migrants suffering in Libya and other places, asking, “can we have them in Rwanda?” adding, “We can let them stay here if they want.”

For London, the agreement was intended to deter irregular Channel crossings, which reached nearly 46,000 in 2022, fell back, then climbed again to about 37,000 in 2024 and more than 40,000 in 2025. Dozens have died attempting the journey.

Channel Crossings, Political Pressure

Immigration has remained central to British politics since Brexit in 2020. The government says it has removed 50,000 undocumented people, while in September it launched a “one-in-one-out” arrangement with France to swap asylum seekers for those with UK family ties, a policy criticized by NGOs as “cruel” and ineffective.

Starmer himself had attacked the Rwanda scheme while in opposition. In a Nov. 23, 2023 post on X, he wrote that then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak had “wasted £140 million of taxpayers’ money on his unlawful Rwanda scheme,” arguing Labour instead would target smuggling gangs and clear the asylum backlog.

Now in office, Starmer faces Rwanda’s compensation claim even as Channel arrivals remain elevated and Britain recalibrates its deterrence strategy.

The arbitration exposes the hard limits of outsourcing asylum enforcement. With £240 million already paid, only four migrants relocated, and £50 million now contested in court, the case highlights how migration policy, legal risk, and regional security – from the English Channel to eastern Congo – have become tightly entangled.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia have escalated pressure on eastern Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar, treating his alleged facilitation of Emirati support to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as a strategic liability rather than a tolerable ambiguity.

According to a Middle East Eye exclusive story, Cairo warned that continued assistance could trigger a fundamental reassessment of its long-standing relationship with Haftar, reframing him from security partner to regional risk.

The issue is not ideological alignment but logistics: arms, fuel, drones, and fighters moving across Libya into Sudan since the outbreak of war in April 2023. Egyptian officials now argue that these supply chains have materially altered the battlefield, enabling RSF advances and deepening instability along the Egypt-Libya-Sudan border triangle.

“Summoned, Not Invited”

Earlier this month, Saddam Haftar, Khalifa Haftar’s son and deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), was called to Cairo for meetings with Egyptian Defense Minister Abdel Meguid Saker and senior intelligence officials.

A senior Egyptian army source told Middle East Eye that Saddam Haftar was “literally summoned to Egypt, not invited for a courtesy visit,” after Cairo confirmed Emirati weapons transfers to the RSF with LAAF assistance. The source said officials presented evidence of fuel deliveries from Libya’s Sarir refinery to RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, alongside shipments of weapons, portable air defense systems, and drones from the UAE. Egyptian intelligence, the source added, holds aerial imagery tracing weapons movements from Abu Dhabi to eastern Libya and onward into Darfur.

The Sudan conflict has produced stark benchmarks. Since April 2023, the RSF has expanded its control across Darfur, including the fall of el-Fasher after a siege lasting more than 550 days. Thousands are believed to have been killed there, with satellite imagery indicating widespread killings in El Fasher following its capture by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), showing mass graves, large concentrations of bodies, and apparent cremation sites. British MPs were told at least 60,000 people are believed to have been killed, with up to 150,000 residents missing since the city fell on 26 October 2025.

Human rights experts say the evidence points to one of the gravest crimes of the Sudan war, which has already been defined by large-scale atrocities and ethnic cleansing.

Accordingly, Egyptian officials assess that RSF logistics routes established in June, particularly through Libya, directly enabled such outcome. “Without such support, the RSF would not have achieved its recent advances,” the Egyptian source said.

Escalation Control at the Border

Warnings to Haftar were reinforced by direct military action. A second Egyptian military source said Cairo conducted an air strike on a convoy crossing from Libya toward RSF-held territory near the al-Uwaynat border triangle, southwest of Egypt and southeast of Libya’s Kufra region.

The convoy included dozens of vehicles carrying fuel, weapons, and military equipment. “Most of the vehicles were destroyed and fuel trucks caught fire,” the source said.

Egyptian armed forces have since maintained continuous air patrols, with instructions that “any military movement from Libya towards Sudan to support Hemedti’s militia will be targeted.”

Satellite imagery strengthens Cairo’s claims of Haftar’s supply chains to RSF. AfriMEOSINT reported that imagery from August to September showed heavy UAE-linked IL-76 cargo aircraft activity at Kufra Airport, consistent with arms deliveries and the movement of foreign fighters.

Egyptian intelligence also monitored, via audio and visual surveillance, the arrival of mercenaries from Colombia and Venezuela into Libya before their transfer to Sudan, according to the same army source.

Regional Realignment Pressures

Cairo and Riyadh have paired coercion with incentives. According to the Egyptian army official, both offered Saddam Haftar alternative financial and military support to replace Emirati backing. The meetings were followed by a Saudi arms deal with Pakistan worth $4bn, with weapons expected to be distributed between Haftar’s forces and Sudan’s army under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Egyptian officials also warned Haftar of alleged Emirati contingency plans to fragment Libya once the RSF consolidates control over Darfur and Kordofan, including separating Jufra and Sirte.

The pressure campaign unfolds amid an unusually public rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Recent developments underscore growing Saudi pressure against Emirati activism across the region.

In Yemen, Saudi-backed government forces, supported by Riyadh’s air power, swiftly rolled back gains made by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council earlier this month, forcing its leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi to flee after just five days.

The episode was accompanied by rare public exchanges of criticism between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, signalling a more assertive Saudi stance. Egypt has aligned with this push, with Middle East Eye reporting that Cairo shared intelligence with Saudi Arabia on Emirati activities. A Cairo-based analyst told MEE that the UAE’s backing of the RSF fits a wider strategy to shape outcomes in Sudan and Libya, but one that increasingly collides with Saudi interests, as Riyadh views the RSF’s rise as destabilising and a direct challenge to Saudi-backed forces in Yemen.

Accordingly, Saudi writer Dr. Ahmed bin Othman Al-Tuwaijri argued in Al-Jazirah that Abu Dhabi’s regional policy works “to give Israel a foothold in the Horn of Africa and control Bab al-Mandab.”

The article further accused UAE of issuing explicit directives “to prepare military bases to serve Israeli operations in Gaza”, alleging Emirati interference from Tunisia to Somalia and efforts to secure Bab al-Mandab for Israel.

Russia has echoed similar critiques at the UN. On Dec. 24, envoy Vassily Nebenzya said Washington and its partners were “deliberately foment[ing] tensions” under the pretext of counterterrorism, using Sudan and Libya as pressure points.

Uganda’s post-election crisis has moved decisively into the security sphere, as the country’s military leadership inserted itself directly into partisan politics following the January presidential vote. Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the chief of Uganda’s Army (UPDF) and son of President Yoweri Museveni, publicly threatened opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi, known as Bobi Wine, days after Museveni was declared the winner with about 75 percent of the vote.

Kainerugaba used his official X account on January 19 to issue an ultimatum: “I am giving him exactly 48 hours to surrender himself to the Police.” He added, “If he doesn’t we will treat him as an outlaw/rebel and handle him accordingly.”

In another post referencing Wine’s National Unity Platform (NUP), the general wrote: “We have killed 22 NUP terrorists since last week. I’m praying the 23rd is Kabobi.”

Police spokesperson Kituma Rusoke later said Wine was not being sought, highlighting a sharp disconnect between military rhetoric and civilian law enforcement.

“48 Hours to Surrender”

The threats followed disputed election results announced last week, after which Wine alleged widespread fraud and fled his home in Magere, Kampala. His party initially claimed he was kidnapped by military personnel using an army helicopter, alleging guards were assaulted and power and security cameras were cut. Police rejected the account. Wine later posted on X that he was hiding, contradicting the kidnapping claim but reinforcing fears about his personal security.

Bobi Wine has also responded on X on Jan. 20 with a detailed account of what he described as escalating intimidation around his home, directly linking the general’s online threats to events on the ground. “Last night as Museveni’s son was making these threats to kill me and gloating over killing 22 of our supporters (in reality, he has killed over 100 since last week), the military who are stationed inside our compound yet again banged my house doors as they sang profanities, ordering the occupants to come out of the house if they’re men,” he wrote.

He added that those present believed “the criminals seemed to be drunk,” and accused security forces of collectively punishing his family by cutting off supplies: “They’re starving after these criminals blocked food from reaching them. They cut the padlocks of our gates and replaced them with chains.”

The military chief’s remarks fit a broader pattern of personal and persistent online attacks against Bobi Wine. Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba has repeatedly used his official X account to mock the opposition leader, refer to him by derogatory nicknames such as “Kabobi,” and frame him as a criminal or security threat rather than a political rival. These posts, often issued late at night and during moments of political tension, have included taunts, threats, and inflammatory language that blur the line between personal insult and state intimidation, reinforcing concerns about the politicization of the military and the shrinking space for opposition politics in Uganda.

A Stressful Election

The election unfolded under restrictive conditions. Uganda shut down the internet 48 hours before polling, ordering rights groups to halt operations as Museveni sought a seventh term in office.

Authorities said the blackout was intended to preserve public order. Opposition groups said it obstructed election monitoring and facilitated abuses. Court documents show at least 118 NUP members were charged on Monday with election-related offenses, including unlawful assembly and conspiracy, charges the party’s secretary general David Rubongoya denied.

Post-election violence was reported in several locations. Police killed several opposition supporters in central Uganda in disputed circumstances, although large-scale violence on the scale of past regional crises did not materialize.

History of Inflammatory Rhetoric

Kainerugaba, 51, has a long record of provocative social media statements that blur military professionalism and personal politics. In 2022, he threatened to invade neighboring Kenya. Last year, he claimed to be holding Wine’s bodyguard in his basement and threatened to castrate him. The bodyguard was later charged with robbery.

On January 19, Kainerugaba posted another controversial message, claiming divine affiliation of the armies of Uganda, Rwanda & Israel, even though Uganda’s Constitution, adopted in 1995, establishes Uganda as a secular State. He said in his tweet “Almighty God has only three armies on earth. UPDF, RDF and IDF. May God bless His armies always.”

Kainerugaba has openly expressed his ambition to succeed his father, who has ruled Uganda since 1986 and is now 81 years old. Museveni has denied grooming his son for power, but the general’s visibility and rhetoric reinforces perceptions that Uganda’s military hierarchy is entangled with succession politics.

Opposition Under Pressure

Wine, a former pop star who finished runner-up in the election, has continued to issue statements from undisclosed locations, alleging intimidation, abductions, and repression. His movement has faced repeated crackdowns during the campaign, with security forces opening fire on rallies and detaining activists. The combination of internet shutdowns, mass arrests, and direct military threats has intensified concerns among rights groups about the narrowing space for political opposition.

While police insist Wine is not wanted, the military chief’s statements have amplified uncertainty over who controls coercive power in Uganda. The episode highlights a broader regional pattern in which armed forces play an increasingly overt role in electoral disputes, even where formal coups are absent.